

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF HEADS OF DELEGATION
MEETING, MARCH 20

CTB MESSAGE NO. 179

1. SUMMARY. AT MARCH 20 INFORMAL HEADS OF DELEGATION
MEETING WHICH CONTINUED MARCH 17 DISCUSSION OF SOVDEL'S
DRAFT OF A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, WARNKE PRO-
VIDED SOVDEL, AS WELL AS UK DEL, WITH US DEL'S INFORMAL
PAPER ON OBJECTIVES OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS
(ISIS), EXPLAINING THAT IT WAS NOT BEING PROPOSED AS
TREATY LANGUAGE BUT WAS INTENDED TO CLARIFY OUR APPROACH
AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOVDEL'S THINKING OVER THE RECESS
(TEXT SENT SEPTTEL). HE ALSO PROVIDED COPIES OF PAPERS
CONTAINING INFORMATION ON SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES
(SROS) AND THE US PROPOSED DATA AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
(TEXTS SENT SEPTTEL). MOROKHOV EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM
THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON ISIS, AS WELL AS ON PRO-
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VISIONS FOR LAUNCHING OSIS, ALONG LINES OF HIS REMARKS
AT MARCH 17 PLENARY. ON QUESTION OF ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON
RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS FOR OSIS, MOROKHOV INITIALLY TOOK
VERY HARD AND NEGATIVE STAND; THERE WAS STRONG REBUTTAL
BY WARNKE; AND MOROKHOV CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO MODIFYING SOVIET DEL'S ARTICLE III AND THAT HE BELIEV-
ED IT POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION IF WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT

EACH OTHERS' VIEWPOINTS, ESPECIALLY PRINCIPLE THAT INSPECTION COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE HOST PARTY. THROUGHOUT MEETING, EDMONDS (UK) SUPPORTED POINTS MADE BY WARNKE. MOROKHOV CONFIRMED THAT FIRST PLENARY FOLLOWING EASTER BREAK WOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 19. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, WARNKE PROVIDED MOROKHOV WITH COPY OF PAPER "US PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS" WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED IN MOSCOW (STATE CTB MESSAGE #12). END SUMMARY.

2. WARNKE BEGAN DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT OF ISIS, SAYING IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE IF THERE WAS BASIC DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE OR MAINLY A PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEM. IF THE LATTER, THEN THE DEVICE OF USING A TECHNICAL ANNEX MIGHT BE HELPFUL. AND IF THERE WAS NO UNBRIDGEABLE GAP, WE OUGHT TO EXCHANGE DRAFTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND TO TRY TO FIND THE "GOLDEN MEAN" ON THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF NECESSARY DETAIL. WARNKE CIRCULATED AN INFORMAL US DEL PAPER ON OBJECTIVES OF ISIS, EXPLAINING THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED AS TREATY LANGUAGE BUT TO CLARIFY US APPROACH AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOVIET THINKING DURING THE RECESS. IN EXPLAINING THE OBJECTIVES FOR THE UPGRADED SYSTEM, HE STRESSED THAT TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SENSITIVITY OF THE SEISMOMETERS SHOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES (SROS), WHICH IS SECRET

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EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AND THAT UPGRADING IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY OF THE STATIONS WOULD SERVE COMMON INTERESTS UNDER A CTB BECAUSE THIS WOULD MINIMIZE THE NECESSITY FOR MAINTENANCE AND ACCESS TO THE EQUIPMENT BY VISITING PERSONNEL. WARNKE ALSO DISTRIBUTED PAPERS CONTAINING INFORMATION ON SROS AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR A DATA AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM, EXPLAINING THAT THIS MATERIAL MIGHT ALSO BE HELPFUL TO THE SOVIETS DURING THE RECESS. IN ANSWER TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION BY MOROKHOV ON WHEN WE FORESAW INSTALLATION OF PERMANENT FIXTURES AND WHETHER OR WHEN THERE WOULD BE UPGRADING, WARNKE SAID THAT WE PROPOSE TO INSTALL AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE AND SROS WOULD BE THE BEST CHOICE FOR THIS WITH SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS; E.G., FOR AUTHENTICATION AND FOR IMPROVED RECORDING. BUT THIS INITIAL EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT BE THE FINAL EQUIPMENT. WE WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, WANT TO UPGRADE COMMUNICATIONS AND RELIABILITY TO ENSURE A MINIMUM OF MALFUNCTIONS AND TO REDUCE THE TIME NEEDED FOR MAINTENANCE BY VISITING PERSONNEL. STILL, MANY DETAILS WOULD BE LEFT FOR THE JCC.

3. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT US PROPOSALS WERE BASED ON AN IDEAL SITUATION FOR STARTING THE TREATY. THE SOVIETS HAD NO EQUIPMENT OF THE SORT THE US DEL DESCRIBED, AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO USE WHAT IT HAD. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO PLANS TO MAKE THIS EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS A VERY COMPLEX SITUATION WHICH MOROKHOV DID NOT KNOW HOW TO HANDLE. IF THE TREATY WERE TO COME INTO FORCE IN TEN YEARS, THAT WOULD BE DIFFERENT, BUT THE SOVIETS WANTED A TREATY NOW. WARNKE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY

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OF HAVING A TREATY WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON THE KIND OF EQUIPMENT WE HAD PROPOSED. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS COULD EXAMINE THE SROS WITH US. IT WAS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT MAKE SOME JOINT MODIFICATIONS. WE WOULD PROCEED ON A PHASED BASIS, AND WE WOULD NEED AGREEMENT ON OBJECTIVES AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE FINAL PHASE. SOME OF THE TECHNICAL DETAILS COULD BE IN AN ANNEX. REFERENCE TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SROS COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. PRECISE TIMING AND SCHEDULES FOR INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS. WARNKE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH A REASONABLE AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS. MOROKHOV SAID THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE CLARITY OF THE ANSWERS HE HAD RECEIVED.

4. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF LAUNCHING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (OSIS), WARNKE REVIEWED POINTS MADE AT MARCH 17 HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING (PARA 7 OF CTB 178) ON NATURE OF

EVENT, AND PURPOSE AND EVIDENCE FOR OSIS. HE MADE FOLLOW-
ING ADDITIONAL POINTS: THAT SEQUENCE IN STARTING OSIS
SHOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD FIRST BE TENTATIVE ACCEPTANCE,
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BUT NO AGREEMENT ACTUALLY TO PROCEED WITH THE OSI UNTIL
AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE PRECISE BOUNDARIES OF
THE INSPECTION AREA, INCLUDING ANY EXEMPTED AREAS; THAT
SOVIET ARTICLE III LEFT AGREEMENT ON RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS
FOR OSIS TO BE DETERMINED ON A COMPLETELY AD HOC BASIS,
WHEREAS US ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT WAS BASED ON NECESSITY FOR
HAVING BASIC RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS AGREED IN ADVANCE WITH
POSSIBILITY OF DETERMINING CERTAIN ADDITIONAL, OR SECOND
TIER, RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR INSPEC-
TION; THAT LANGUAGE IN PARA 4 OF SOVIET ARTICLE III WAS
REDUNDANT IN THAT MANY OTHER PHRASES OF SOVIET ARTICLE
REFLECTED VOLUNTARINESS OF INSPECTION SYSTEM; AND,
FINALLY, THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO HAVE AN AGREED
UNDERSTANDING RULING OUT ARBITRARINESS BOTH IN REQUESTING
AND RESPONDING TO REQUESTS. MOROKHOV EXPRESSED GRATITUDE
FOR PRECISE AND DETAILED NATURE OF WARNKE'S COMMENTS AND
THOUGHT THESE WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HIM IN THE RECESS. ON
SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE "VERY
UNSATISFACTORY" IF EXEMPTED AREAS WERE TO BE SET OUT
BEFORE THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON AN OSI. AND ON ARTICLE II,
PARA 4, HE THOUGHT SOME REVISION MIGHT BE FORMULATED BUT
THAT THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT PROVISION.

5. ON RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS FOR OSIS, WARNKE STRESSED THAT
SOVDEL'S DRAFT CONTAINED A NUMBER OF RIGHTS, BUT IT WAS
COMPLETELY LACKING IN SPECIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS, THAT
IS, HOW THESE RIGHTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. FOR EXAMPLE,
HOW WOULD THE INSPECTION AREA BE VERIFIED--WITH WHAT
EQUIPMENT? WHAT KIND OF MEASUREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT COULD
BE USED TO STUDY RADIATION? MOREOVER, THERE WERE IMPOR-
TANT OMISSIONS IN SOVIET DRAFT, E.G., ACTIVITIES SHOULD
INCLUDE TAKING SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS, TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS,
LOOKING FOR TESTING ARTIFACTS. ON JCC, WE ALSO ENVISAGED
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SOME ROLE, BUT WE BELIEVE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE AGREED AND
CLEARLY SPECIFIED IN ADVANCE IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT,
INCLUDING DURATION OF OSI, NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL AND
SPECIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT. NOT ONLY WAS THIS ESSENTIAL
FOR US BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE EASIER TO DO THIS IN ADVANCE
THAN TO BUCK IT ALL TO THE JCC. ON EQUIPMENT, THE BASIC

ITEMS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED FOR USE IN ADVANCE EVEN IF ALL OF THEM WEREN'T USED IN EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE. IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL TO TRY TO AGREE TO EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT ON AN AD HOC BASIS. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROCEDURES TO ASSURE THE HOST PARTY THAT EQUIPMENT WOULD SERVE ONLY AUTHORIZED PURPOSES. WHILE WE AGREE THAT HOST PARTY PERSONNEL SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ACCOMPANY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, THERE SHOULD BE A CLEARER DELINEATION OF WHICH PERSONNEL PERFORM WHICH FUNCTIONS. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT ANALYSIS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS PRACTICAL TO PREPARE A JOINT REPORT. WHERE THERE ARE NO MAJOR DIFFICULTIES, A JOINT REPORT IS NOT NEEDED. BUT WHERE THERE HAS BEEN DISAGREEMENT, A JOINT REPORT IS NOT FEASIBLE.

6. MOROKHOV SAID THAT THESE COMMENTS HAD NOT HELPED HIM AT ALL. HE HAD HEARD NOTHING NEW. WE WERE MAKING A POLICE FUNCTION OUT OF INSPECTIONS. THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THIS BECAUSE IT WOULD RESULT IN CONFRONTATION RATHER THAN COOPERATION. MAYBE US APPROACH WOULD BE CONVINCING TO US CONGRESS AND PUBLIC, BUT IT WOULDN'T PROVIDE A SOLUTION. IT WAS SIMPLE TO KNOW IF AN EXPLOSION TOOK PLACE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEAL ONE. THE US WAS COMPLICATING THE ISSUE AND CREATING AN OBSTACLE.

7. IN RESPONSE, WARNKE MADE A STRONG REBUTTAL THAT HE HAD HEARD SOMETHING NEW BECAUSE MOROKHOV SEEMED TO BE GOING BACK ON SOVIET STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 2 IN WHICH HE HAD AGREED TO THE IDEA OF ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC RIGHTS

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AND FUNCTIONS. THERE WERE NO FUNCTIONS AT ALL IN SOVIET

DRAFT AND THIS WAS A COMPLICATION. WARNKE CONTINUED WITH DISCUSSION OF SOVIET LANGUAGE ON JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC), SAYING THAT MUCH OF THIS LANGUAGE COULD BE ACCEPTABLE, OR A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, PROVIDING THERE WAS SPECIFIC ENOUGH AGREEMENT ELSEWHERE ON ISIS AND OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. WE COULD NOT DEFAULT ON OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND TURN THE TASK OF AGREEMENT OVER TO THE JCC. THE JCC COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT FOR OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS IN THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME BETWEEN A REQUEST AND THE BEGINNING OF AN INSPECTION. WARNKE COULD NOT SEE WHAT WAS THE BIG PRINCIPLE ADVERSELY EFFECTING SOVIET SOVEREIGNTY IN HAVING REASONABLE ADVANCE AGREEMENT. HE RECOGNIZED HOWEVER THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED COUNTRIES. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSISTANCE BY THE HOST PARTY WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. HE THOUGHT SITUATION WAS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO ISIS. WE WOULD HAVE TO REACH FOR THE "GOLDEN MEAN" IN THE LEVEL OF DETAIL TO BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT. EDMONDS COMMENTED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ANNEX COULD BE CONSIDERED NOT ONLY FOR ISIS BUT ALSO FOR OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.

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8. MOROKHOV SAID THAT PERHAPS HE HAD OVER-REACTED TO WARNKE'S COMMENTS. HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MODIFYING SOVDEL'S ARTICLE III ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OR TO EXPANDING ARTICLE IV ON THE JCC. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ARTICLE III IF WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT EACH OTHERS' VIEWPOINTS. KEY PRINCIPLE WAS THAT NO INSPECTION COULD BE SUCCESSFUL WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE INSPECTED PARTY. IF THIS WERE UNDERSTOOD, HE DID NOT FORESEE DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING TOGETHER ON LANGUAGE.

9. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED WITH FOLLOWING SUMMARY: HE WAS READY TO CONSIDER TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR ISIS UNDER ARTICLE I. HE WAS ALSO WILLING TO WORK ON UPGRADING OF STATIONS AND ENTRUSTING DETAILS TO THE JCC. HE COULD ALSO CONSIDER SOME LANGUAGE IN FORM WHICH SERVES DOMESTIC NEEDS IN THE US (BUT HE WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHICH PART OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT HE WAS REFERRING TO HERE). BUT HE COULD NEVER AGREE TO ANY PROVISIONS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SOVIET INTERNAL LAWS. ON THE JCC, HE SAW NO MAJOR DIFFICULTIES; WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA PROVIDED THE PROVISIONS WERE BALANCED AND DID NOT GO INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL ON ANY ASPECT.

10. MOROKHOV CONFIRMED THAT, FOLLOWING THE EASTER BREAK

WHICH WOULD BEGIN AFTER MARCH 21 PLENARY, THE NEXT
PLENARY MEETING WOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 19.

11. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING ADJOURNED, WARNKE PROVIDED TO MOROKHOV A COPY OF THE PAPER "US PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS" EXPLAINING THAT THIS WAS THE PAPER WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED TO GROMYKO DURING FALL CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT IT HAD
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RECENTLY BEEN DELIVERED BY OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. MOROKHOV KNEW THAT THE PAPER HAD BEEN PROMISED EARLIER, BUT HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED REGARDING ITS DELIVERY IN MOSCOW. WARNKE

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